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Abstract 
Phishing threatens the information security of Internet users and corporations. Where most 
research focuses on the phisher’s website, i.e., how to determine if a website is legitimate or not, 
this study examines the email that begins the phishing process. To understand why Internet 
consumers respond to phisher’s emails by sharing sensitive information, we draw on models of 
e-commerce deception to explain the efficacy of phishing strategies (e.g., content and 
presentation) found in the content of email messages. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 
field experiment that manipulated the content of phishing emails. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, we found content manipulations improved the likelihood of our subjects’ conveying 
sensitive information. Further, we found that cognitive processes can influence a consumer’s 
likelihood of being deceived. However, hypotheses about deception support mechanisms and 
presentation manipulations were not supported. In sum, we find support for the general theory 
of ecommerce deception as well as our cognitive processing explanations for phishing’s 
effectiveness. The paper concludes with practical and research implications. 
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Introduction 
Almost every Internet consumer has received a phishing email soliciting sensitive information. In a typical 
year, more than 65 million Americans received illegitimate emails seeking contact information, Social 
Security numbers, or financial information (Anti-Phishing Working Group 2013). 2013 was a record year 
for phishing attacks on corporations (Symantec 2014). Companies suffered major losses in both customer 
confidence and market share due to breaches caused by phishing attacks. For example, in late 2013, an 
employee for a firm that does the sub-contracting work for most of the Target stores fell for a phishing 
attack. Using this employee’s login credentials, cybercriminals were able to not only gain access to 
Target’s network, but to install software in 1700 stores that collected credit card information. This results 
in over 70 million customer’s credit cards being compromised (Bjorhus 2014). Despite public awareness 
of the dangers of sharing information over the Internet, phishing attacks have increased by 200% and 
remain effective, with more than 2.85 million Internet consumers sharing sensitive information since 
2008 (Anti-Phishing Working Group 2013).  
Phishing is “a criminal mechanism employing both social engineering and technological subterfuge to 
steal consumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials.” (Anti-Phishing Working Group 
2013 p.2). Technological subterfuge involves schemes to plant malware on consumers’ computers to steal 
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usernames and passwords. Social engineering attacks use messages from purported legitimate sources to 
trick consumers into divulging sensitive information (Dhamija et al. 2006; RSA Security 2008). Email is 
phishers’ primary social engineering tool (Anti-Phishing Working Group 2013). Typically, Internet 
consumers receive an unsolicited email, which offers a benefit in exchange for information. The 
consumers are asked either to click on a link in the email or directly respond to the email itself.  
In order to better understand why consumers fall prey to phishing, it is important for research to examine 
the email message in a behavioral context. This is particularly important because email-only phishing 
attacks (sometimes referred to as spear phishing) are on the rise (Schwartz 2011).  Typically, research has 
examined one of two methods for detecting a phishing email (Wright et al. Forthcoming).  Either, there is 
an attempt to develop better techniques to filter phishing messages (i.e., spam filters) or to develop better 
deception detection support mechanisms (toolbars and plug-ins) that examine specific email properties. 
Unfortunately, neither filtering or deception detection support mechanisms have been very successful 
(Fette et al. 2007).  
Hence, this study focuses on understanding why consumers respond to the content of phishing emails 
rather than the properties of the phishing web site itself. Prior research has examined behavioral 
characteristics, such as individual and situational characteristics that lead to phishing emails’ 
effectiveness. For example, Wright and Marett (2010) focused on experiential and dispositional factors 
that increase the likelihood of detecting phishing. They found that experiential factors (e.g., computer 
self-efficacy, web experience and security knowledge) significantly influenced deception success. Further, 
they found that dispositional factors were less predictive of phishing e-mail’s effectiveness, with only 
suspicion predicting deception success. Although extant research has provided initial evidence of 
behavioral reasons why deception tactics work there remain substantial opportunities to examine 
consumers’ behaviors (Dhamija et al. 2006; Wright et al. 2010b). In particular, deception techniques and 
detection mechanisms, which are important in the deception process, have received limited attention 
(Xiao et al. 2011).  More specifically, our study addresses the following research questions:   
RQ1: What content-based properties of phishing emails increase the likelihood of 
sensitive information sharing? 
 
RQ2: What cognitive processing styles increase the likelihood of sensitive information sharing? 
Although researchers have started to explore the behavioral aspects of social engineering, inconsistent 
results may impede practitioners when applying this stream of research. Table 1 provides a summary of 
results in past phishing studies. For example, there has been mixed results with regard to whether online 
experience is a factor to the success of phishing message. Likewise, results for the impact of demographic 
factors like the gender of the intended victim have also been mixed.  Taking together, the literature 
presented in Table 1 and other reviews of the phishing literature (Purkait 2012), it seems probable that 
there may be other underexplored factors that may impact one’s appraisal of a phishing message. A clear 
theoretical framework is needed to guide researchers in their investigations of why phishing is effective.  
Also, it is important that any study on phishing incorporate an investigation of the properties in the email.  
Social engineering research suggests that e-mails’ content may also explain why Internet consumers are 
deceived by phishing emails. Social engineering principles were originally developed to help understand 
why consumers fall prey to illegitimate telephone, mail, or face-to-face solicitations for sensitive 
information such as credit card numbers or passwords (Mitnick et al. 2005). Consider a typical phishing 
email. There are three elements that social engineers suggest help deceive consumers. First, the option 
exists for the phisher to personalize the message. Although our sample email is not personalized to the 
individual consumer, it is focused on a narrow band of Internet consumers, the customers of a specific 
financial institution. Second, the email contains a “call to action,” i.e., a specific timeframe for responding. 
Finally, the phisher may embed cues or information that improves message legitimacy. In our email, 
sender information is embedded in two locations, the graphic header and the text-based footer. Social 
engineering principles suggest that by incorporating such elements in emails phishers increase the 
likelihood that an Internet consumer will share information.  
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Table 1. Results of Past Phishing Studies 
Phishing Factors Supported Not Supported Partially Supported 
Online Experience 
 
(Sheng et al. 2010) 
(Wright et al. 2010b)  
(Downs et al. 2006) 
(Dhamija et al. 2006) 
(Jingguo et al. 2012) 
 
Security Awareness (Jakobsson 2007; Wright 
et al. 2010b) (Mohebzada 
et al. 2012) 
(Downs et al. 2006) 
(Dhamija et al. 2006) 
(Jingguo et al. 2012) 
 
Education (Jagatic et al. 2007) 
(Sheng et al. 2010) 
(Dhamija et al. 2006)  
Relationship with Sender (Jagatic et al. 2007)  (Kumaraguru et al. 
2007b) 
Women are more vulnerable (Sheng et al. 2010) (Dhamija et al. 2006) 
(Mohebzada et al. 2012) 
 
Age (Sheng et al. 2010) (Dhamija et al. 2006) 
(Mohebzada et al. 2012) 
 
Risk (Sheng et al. 2010) (Wright et al. 2010b)  
Trust (Jakobsson 2007) (Wright et al. 2010b)  
Hence, this study empirically also examines how the content of phishing e-mails relates to the efficacy of 
Phishing e-mails.  To do so, we leverage theoretical insights offered by Xiao and Benbasat (2011) to 
explain why message recipients may be prone to responding to phishing emails. The general goal of this 
study is help researchers and practitioners develop prescriptions or tools that enable Internet consumers 
to protect their data from phishers.  
To investigate our question, we begin by tying current research on phishing to the deception information 
practices literature. Next, we identify a psychological theory that helps to explain deception detection. 
Specifically, we use the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty et al. 1999) to explain the effectiveness 
of phishing tactics. Then, we describe our field experiment, which directly manipulated emails’ content to 
evaluate whether different phishing tactics lead to Internet consumers’ sharing information. We conclude 
with a discussion of our results implications for future phishing research and the suggestions this research 
can offer to practitioners. 
A Taxonomy of Phishing 
To lure consumers into sharing information, phishers use deceptive techniques that seek to increase 
Internet consumers’ perceptions of their messages or websites’ legitimacy. Deception refers to “a message 
knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver” of the message 
(Buller et al. 1996b pg. 121). The key word in the definition is “knowingly,” as the intent of the sender 
(henceforth referred to as phisher) rules out including the transmission of false information by mistake or 
accident. Therefore, cues in the deceitful message are purposefully developed by a phisher, with careful 
thought given to how they influence the receiver’s decision making (Dhamija et al. 2006).  
Effective deceptive techniques avoid the appearance of “deviating” from what is normal. Burgoon and 
colleagues (2008) suggest that deceptive tactics are more effective when they create an outwardly realistic 
message. By doing so, phishers prevent triggering a state of suspicion in the message’s receiver (Zhou et 
al. 2004). Within the field of information systems, deceptive tactics have been investigated in various 
experiments involving the falsification of personnel information within databases (Biros et al. 2002) and 
fraudulent e-commerce websites (Grazioli et al. 2003a; Grazioli et al. 2003b; Riquelme et al. 2004).  
Prior research has developed many ways of classifying deception techniques in online and face-to-face 
interactions.  Of particular interest to this study is the development of Information Manipulation Theory 
(McCornack 1992), which proposes that deceivers intentionally modify the quantity, quality, and manner 
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in such a way as to divert message receivers attention.  Researchers have since appropriated the theory to 
help explain deception conducted via computer-mediated communication (e.g. Johnson et al., 2001). 
Drawing on the work of Buller, Burgoon, and colleagues (Buller et al. 1996a; Burgoon et al. 1994) and 
extending Johnson et al.’s (2001) implementation of Information Manipulation Theory, Xiao and 
Benbasat (2011) developed a three-part typology of online ecommerce deception techniques: 
1. The manipulation of information content. In terms of e-commerce, this type of deception “refers to 
the direct alteration of the content of product information provided at an e-commerce website” (Xiao 
et al. 2011 p. 172). 
2. The manipulation of information presentation, “which refers to the manipulation of the design of 
how product information is presented to consumers at in e-commerce website” (Xiao et al. 2011 p. 
172). 
3. “The manipulation of information generation, which refers to the manipulation of the dynamic 
production of product information at an e-commerce website, based on consumer interests, needs 
and/or preferences obtained explicitly or implicitly” (Xiao et al. 2011 p. 172). 
While Xiao and Benbasat (2011) offer a typology of deception techniques (content, presentation, and 
information generation manipulations) that shape a phishing e-mail’s authenticity, research has not 
empirically examined how these techniques effect Internet consumers’ information sharing. In the 
following section, we describe a study that employs a theory-based approach to empirically test the 
effectiveness of these information manipulation tactics (See propositions 18 & 19 Xiao et al. 2011). 
Specifically, drawing from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), we describe the process through 
which Internet consumers appraise messages and test whether content-based or presentation-based 
manipulations lead to email recipients sharing information. 
Due to the nature of the email of interactive websites, information generation manipulation is somewhat 
limited. Typically information generation is done in a back-and-forth communication between the 
systems (or deceiver) and the target of the deception. This includes personalization of deception 
information based on what the target is doing real-time. The closest attribute to information generation is 
the mass customization that we see in the real phishing email example, where an email is sent to many 
people some of which belong to the credit union. Phishing emails that lack customization, yet are allegedly 
from an institution that the consumer does business with, will have a high probability of deception 
detection or will be discarded without a thought. Therefore, information generation is outside the scope 
of this empirical research, as we will be controlling for personalization of the message through the 
experimental design.      
Cognitive Mechanisms in Deception Detection 
 To elicit sensitive information, phishers take advantage of how Internet consumers cognitively process 
messages that contain imperfect information. The cognitive psychology literature offers insight into 
individuals’ decision-making when presented limited information (e.g., phishing emails rich in content 
and presentation tactics). Dual-processing theories explain how an outcome can result from one of two 
psychological processes that result in changes in mind-set and subsequent actions. The application of 
dual-process theories is common in psychology (Petty et al. 1986; Petty et al. 1981; Warden et al. 2006; 
Werner et al. 2002) and has been applied to explain a range of purchasing activities (Areni 2003), 
decision-making efforts (Nah et al. 2004), web personalization strategies (Tam et al. 2005), and even 
information technology acceptance (Bhattacherjee et al. 2006).  
To examine the effectiveness of phishing, we leverage ELM, a dual processing theory, to explain why 
consumers respond to deceptive emails. This decision making process describes not only the role of 
beliefs, thoughts and perceptions, but also how individuals form them. ELM theorizes that “the classic 
sources (e.g., expertise), message (e.g., number of arguments), recipient (e.g., mood), and contextual (e.g., 
distraction) variables have an impact on attitudes towards objects, issues, and people.” (Petty et al. 1999 
pg. 42). These ideas are consistent with what Benbasat and Xiao (2011) refer to as the cognitive 
mechanisms’ of stimulus, organism and response framework. Specifically, they suggest that “the 
deception detection process may result in consumers’ belief that the e-commerce website is deceptive and 
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subsequently lead to an avoidance behavior on the part of the consumers” (pg. 178). ELM suggests that 
the detection decision process occurs along a continuum that ranges from low cognition to high cognition. 
Under low conditions, individuals do not deeply think about the information that shapes their decisions. 
Under high conditions, individuals carefully scrutinize their choices and reflect on likely outcomes (Petty 
et al. 1986). Hence, when consumers rely on low cognition, they are more apt to decide to respond to 
deceptive emails.  
Consistent with neuroscience research (Grèzes et al. 2005; Grèzes et al. 2004; Hughes et al. 2005) that 
suggests distinct areas of the brain are activated during decision making, ELM proposes that two cognitive 
processes shape decision-making, the central route and the peripheral route, and that motivation and the 
ability to process information drive which route will be utilized (Petty et al. 1986). The central route 
involves cognition-based processing and critical thinking, as the receiver of the message typically has the 
motivation and ability to closely scrutinize the information contained in a message, before either 
attitudinal change occurs or the receiver selects a course of action. The peripheral route is more 
unconscious, automatic, and associative, as the receiver of the message tends to rely on simple cues and 
readily available decision rules for making judgments, as opposed to the use of more thoughtful central 
processing. According to the ELM-based research, when individuals perceive a situation as complex or 
uncertain, they engage in central route processing, and exert effort to make the correct decision; that is, 
unless they perceive a situation as simple, in which case they rely on peripheral decision making 
(Feigenson 2006).   
Beyond the context or uncertainty, researchers in marketing have investigated conditions under which 
consumers engage in central or peripheral processing. For example, Karmarkar and Tormala (2009) 
examined subjects’ perceptions of a restaurant reviewer’s expertise based solely on the message content. 
Of relevance to this study was the finding that readers who peripherally examined the message tended to 
be persuaded by the review, regardless if the reviewer was credible.  Although ELM was developed as a 
means for understanding processing styles, some suggest that objective categorization of cues that prompt 
individuals to use either central or peripheral processing routes can yield insight into decision-making 
(Bitner et al. 1985).  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Information content manipulation is the direct altering of content. In terms of phishing, information 
content can be manipulated or “socially engineered” to offer the appearance of normalcy. This type of 
deception involves manipulations of differing content-based information (Burgoon et al. 1996; 
McCornack et al. 1992). Past studies in deceptive communication indicate that most people are unlikely to 
detect deception if only attending to cues (e.g., misspelling, sender information) that proceed from the 
message, rather than analyzing the message for discrepancies (e.g., how truthful is the message) (Miller et 
al. 1993).  Further, empirical tests of a deception detection model (See Park et al. 2001) point to greater 
accuracy in deception detection for messages that are manipulated to have more truthful content than lies 
(i.e., have a truthful bias). In other words, the messages with more lies are harder to detect than messages 
with a single lie. Therefore, we expect that phishers who utilize content-based tactics have a better chance 
of successfully duping message recipients into responding with the information that the phishers desire.  
Xiao and Benbasat (2011) outline a typology of deception information practices as noted above. It is 
important to operationalize this conceptual typology in terms that describe phishers’ operational-level 
techniques. The dimensions of operational-level technique in content manipulation are completeness, 
clarity, and veridicality. In phishing, we often find these types of content manipulation (Fette et al. 
2007). We draw from Buller’s work to define these terms. Completeness is the withholding of information 
either explicitly or implicitly. We can manipulate completeness by using personalized information. 
Further, completeness in the salutation of an email has variety between no personalization and no 
salutation, to complete personalized, such as “Dear John Smith”.   
Clarity is the manipulation of full information. In phishing this can include part of the message, or all or 
part of the sender’s information. Finally, veridicality is content-manipulation based on false information 
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given in the message. In many phishing emails, including the example of the real phishing message this 
can be a call to action, such as “please answer this email ASAP”. Phishing emails vary greatly in the types 
and levels of these three types of content-based manipulations. According to deception research, each of 
these tactics affects the likelihood of deception success (Buller et al. 1996a; Xiao et al. 2011). Therefore we 
predict: 
H1: A phishing message that contains content manipulations will have a greater chance of success 
than a message without this manipulation. 
H1A: A phishing message that contains completeness manipulations will have a greater chance of 
success than a message without this manipulation. 
H1B: A phishing message that contains clarity manipulations will have a greater chance of success 
than a message without this manipulation. 
H1C: A phishing message that contains veridicality manipulations will have a greater chance of 
success than a message without this manipulation. 
Types of Deception Techniques: Information Presentation 
Information presentation manipulations involve modifying the properties and context surrounding a 
message to influence their interpretation by message receivers. Cues in this category tend to be external to 
the message content itself and have the potential to affect the receiver’s willingness to believe the message 
without even being exposed to the message content (Mondak 1993). For instance, to give the deceptive 
message a more authentic context, phishing efforts (as well as efforts at installing virulent code on targets’ 
computers) may mimic the source email address of a party familiar to the recipient. The logic is that an 
unsuspecting recipient of a phishing message would be more likely to be persuaded to share private 
information when a seemingly-familiar person requests it, such as a person in the same university 
network.  
H2: A phishing message with presentation manipulations will have a greater chance of success 
than a message without this manipulation. 
Deception Detection Support Mechanisms 
The final two hypotheses focus on automated tools and cognitive processes that may aid phishing message 
recipients in detecting deception.  As discussed by in Xiao and Benbasat (2011), most cognitive studies 
have shown that deception detection is little better than chance (Park et al. 2001).  First, Hypothesis 3 
examines any the availability of technology support that may help message recipients. Previous studies, 
mainly in the computer science field, have looked at technology-based solutions for combatting phishing. 
This includes the use of intelligent agents (Fu et al. 2006), analytics (Liu et al. 2006), and training 
systems (Kumaraguru et al. 2007a) that are designed to “red flag” messages originating from questionable 
domains. Further, research suggests that detection support mechanisms such as anti-phishing toolbars 
and spam filters marginally increase deception detection (Sheng et al. 2007). Still, researchers posit that 
deception detection is “more likely to occur when consumers are provided with mechanisms” (Xiao et al. 
2011 p. 186). This includes technology-based mechanisms that identify anomalies or filter possible 
deceptive messages. Therefore, we propose that: 
H3: The availability of technology-based detection mechanisms to message receivers will 
negatively impact the success of the phishing message.  
Cognitive Mechanisms: Central and Peripheral Processing 
Finally, the cognitive processes employed by message recipients are considered to be potential 
impediments toward phishing success.  As discussed earlier, there is little agreement on the individual 
and situational factors that influence one’s susceptibility to phishing message.  Instead, the current study 
examines how consumers’ deception detection process shapes decisions about phishing emails (see the 
cognitive mechanism in Xiao and Benbasat’s theoretical model). Following from ELM, successful phishing 
depends on receivers failing to detect the deceptive intent behind a message; thus, whether emails evoke 
central or peripheral processing is essential to a phisher’s ability to deceive Internet consumers. Research 
Extending Ecommerce Deception to Phishing 
Thirty Fifth International Conference on Information Systems, Auckland 2014     7 
 
on deceptive communication has identified verbal and nonverbal cues that deceivers unwittingly send, 
which can reveal the false nature of the message (DePaulo et al. 2003; Ekman et al. 1991) in either face-to-
face or computer-mediated exchanges. However, noticing the existence of verbal and nonverbal cues is 
difficult, and individuals recognizing them as indicators of deception is even more challenging (Levine et 
al. 1999).  
Because email is a relatively lean medium compared to face-to-face communication (Dennis et al. 2008), 
the medium effectively filters most verbal and nonverbal cues identified in the deception and social 
engineering literatures. Email is less socially rich, making it likely to convey only paralinguistic cues to 
receivers (Rao et al. 2000). This means that noticing deceptive cues contained within an email requires a 
receiver to observe when its phrasing strays from that found in “normal” email messages in a highly 
noticeable way. Examples of cues in an email could include referring to a receiver in an awkward manner 
such as “doctor professor” or using phrases that vary from normal baseline language that the 
communicator has used in the past, such as a sudden increase in negative emotion or increased personal-
distancing language (DePaulo et al. 2003). Absent highly noticeable cues, it is more likely that the receiver 
will detect deception through message content that is personally implausible or contradicts earlier 
content, i.e., internal inconsistencies or discrepancies (Miller et al. 1993).  
Regardless of the type of tactic employed by phishers, ELM suggests that the key driver of deception 
detection will be which cognitive processing route is employed by Internet consumers (e.g., central or 
peripheral). If the central route is activated, which is theoretically resistant to persuasion, a person exerts 
relatively extensive effort to examine the information. However, if the peripheral route is activated, a 
consumer is likely to exert lower cognitive effort and invest less time examining information. Because the 
peripheral process is “relative temporary and susceptible to counter-persuasion” (Petty et al. 1999), 
Internet consumers who rely on peripheral processing are less likely to bring a higher level of cognitive 
resources to bear when evaluating the message. Therefore, when peripheral routes are triggered, an 
Internet consumer is more susceptible to deception.  
Whether phishing emails evoke central or peripheral processing likely influences the efficacy of the 
phishing messages. According to Johnson and colleagues, detecting deceptive information, such as that 
found in phishing messages, is contingent on a sort of violation of expectancies. When the referring email 
appears to be normal, and therefore does not violate expectations and stimulate critical, central 
processing, receivers are more likely to accept the phishing messages as normal. In this circumstance, we 
suspect a kind of “transfer of processing” occurs, with a redirected Internet consumer transferring 
peripheral processing used to evaluate an email to assess the phishing website.  
Based on our review of deception tactics and the ELM, we forward an additional hypothesis based on 
cognitive processing. This hypothesis examines whether central route processing decreases the likelihood 
that a receiver will be deceived. We propose: 
H4: Receivers who use peripheral route processing will be more likely to be deceived than 
receivers who use central route processing. 
Method 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we conducted a field experiment. Two hundred twenty-four students enrolled 
in an introductory MIS course participated in our experiment. The average age of the students was 21.02 
years, and slightly more than half were male (52%). All of the subjects possessed 5 years or more of 
Internet experience and had completed at least one online purchase. One subject acknowledged being a 
victim of phishing/identity theft previously and was removed from the study.  
Procedure. Our field experiment was patterned after prior phishing research (Finn et al. 2008; Wright 
et al. 2010b). The experiment unfolded in three steps. First, unique passwords, which were referred to as 
the “Super Secure Code” (SSC), were issued to each subject the first week in class. The SSC provided 
access to specialized software in a controlled lab. To ensure the subjects understood that keeping the SSC 
private was important, we delivered it in an official university envelope that included the university logo 
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and contact information and a signature across the seal of the envelope. The subject’s name was printed 
on the outside of the envelope. The code was printed on official university letterhead with the injunction 
to “not disclose this [SSC] code to anyone.” Finally, lab instructors explained to subjects that they should 
not share the SSC with anyone under any circumstance, as it could “breech the secure grading process and 
could affect their grade for the class.” Subjects signed a non-disclosure agreement that they would abide 
by the class policy. 
Second, eight weeks into the course, after class lectures on information security and online risks, the 
subjects received an email from a fictitious IT employee, “Jason Roth,” that requested they disclose their 
“Super Secure Code” in order to help recover from a data management accident. This email contained 
combinations of four tactics used by phishers.  
Third, included in a debriefing, we asked the subjects to provide information regarding their experience 
with the phishing email. We asked our subjects to locate the phishing message in their email accounts, if 
possible, and to complete a survey that captured demographic information and asked open-ended 
questions about their experience.  The goal of this step was to determine whether the subject used anti-
phishing software and to evaluate the form of cognitive processing used to evaluate the phishing email. 
The final part of the debriefing session was to let the subject know that the message was a part of the 
phishing experiment and that personal information would be destroyed upon completion of the data 
collection as per Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements for this study. Students were also 
encouraged to contact the research team, or an IRB representative with any question, comments or 
concerns.  
Tactics. Drawing on the hypotheses to guide the operationalization of this field study, we chose to 
manipulate the phishing message presentation by changing the sender’s email domain. All email 
messages have an element of presentation. Our presentation manipulation used one of three email 
domains: 1) a generic “mail.com” account, 2) a spoofed address that appeared to be from the 
university.edu domain, and 3) a legitimate.edu address coordinated with the university behind the scenes. 
The legitimate “.edu” phishing email was sent using the university’s mail servers. Accordingly, the spoofed 
emails were sent using an off-campus mail server configured to send emails that are addressed from the 
same “.edu” domain. This is a common tactic used by phishers. For example, one might receive an email 
from admin@paypa1.com when clearly the origin of the email is not the paypal.com domain.   
The three types of manipulation for content were operationalized as: 1) manipulation by clarity, 2) 
manipulation by completeness, and 3) manipulation by veridicality. Clarity of the message was 
manipulated by supplying specific information to the recipient to gain trust. Clarity manipulations use 
specific semantics and mechanisms familiar to the recipient within the message to avoid suspicion 
(Burgoon et al. 1996). Clarification manipulations in phishing can often be represented by dropping 
names of people or organizations associated with the receivers. We operationalized this by adding a 
condition that included dropping the name of the subject’s instructor into the body of the email. 
Veridicality is often seen as a call to action within a phishing message. We operationalized this with a 
request for an urgent response. Call to action is often utilized during deception interactions; this 
category’s messages are either actual veridicality or apparent veridicality (Burgoon et al. 1996). Scholars 
have expanded the concept of veridicality within the context of e-commerce to include the idea of 
“decoying,” whereby, the veridicality is manipulated by “distracting the victim’s attention away from what 
is really going on” (Grazioli et al. 2003b p. 198). In the case of phishing, this is typically done by adding a 
sense of urgency.  
The last content manipulation technique is completeness. Burgoon et al. (1996) define this manipulation 
as providing the right amount of information to fulfill the conversational demands. Information provided 
can take the form of many aspects of the message. In the case of phishing, personalization of the 
salutation is often used to provide completeness. We manipulated the phishing message accordingly: 
manipulated messages had the complete personalized salutation, and the other condition was more 
generic. In sum, there were four content conditions: 1) completeness (e.g., addressed the subject directly 
in the email), 2) clarity (e.g., used their instructor’s name and their class’s title in the email), 3) 
veridicality (e.g., asked the email be responded to immediately), and 4) low condition that had no content 
other than the call to respond to the email. Finally, the presentation of the message was operationalized 
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by manipulating the sender’s email platform: 1) real university.edu account that was sent from a 
university server (real.edu), 2) spoofed university.edu account that was sent from a spammer email server 
where any domain sent from a dedicated off-campus server, and 3) free email service mail.com (in this 
case mail.com). The phishing effort succeeded when a subject replied with the SSC.  
Evaluating H1 to H3. A fractional factorial design (Pedhazur et al. 1991) was utilized used to evaluate 
the main effects of the phishing tactics’ effectiveness (e.g, H1 to H3). This type of design was selected for 
two reasons. First, ideally in order to provide enough statistical power a full-factorial design 3x2x2x2 
would include 24 treatment conditions that need a minimum of 25 subjects for each condition or 600 
subjects total. Due to a limited amount of subjects available at the business school, we chose to test only 
for the main effects for each condition, allowing us to obtain enough power within constraints of our 
research site (Cook et al. 1979). Given the nature of phishing, the field experiment had to be run one time 
only with our maximum recruitment basis. In other words, as soon as the subjects were run through the 
field experiment no subjects can be recruited for several semesters so that the subjects would not 
contaminate our results thus allowing us the opportunity to execute this experiment every 3 or 4 years. 
We, therefore, made a decision to evaluate the main effect using a fractional 3, 3x1 design. Because each 
email included a sender, the research has no absence of a condition of the presentation manipulation 
team. By designing a fractional experiment, we empirically tested for the increase or decrease in 
likelihood that a subject would answer the phishing email with sensitive information.   
Evaluating H4. Open ended responses collected during the debriefing were coded by three evaluators. 
The goal of this coding of each open-ended response was to determine which the elaboration route that 
the subject used in determining how to act on the phishing email. The independent raters, two of whom 
were on the research team and the other an industry expert, then evaluated each open-ended question 
using a three-step process (Denzin et al. 2003). First, all three evaluators agreed on the basic definitions 
of the coding choices. For the central route, it was determined that this type of process takes place “when 
individuals have the motivation and the ability to process information. Considerable cognitive effort tends 
to be allotted and issue-relevant thinking is typically engaged.” Further, the peripheral route is activated 
“when individuals have an absence of focused examination. This means that the likelihood of the 
individual to elaborate is low and therefore less cognitive processing takes place.” The evaluators were 
also given the ability to code the question as “undetermined” when there was not enough information to 
make a decision between the central route and the peripheral route. The research team understands that a 
subjects’ retrospective recall of the cognitive process may introduce some bias and discuss possible biases 
in the limitation section.  
Before the raters evaluated the transcripts, the raters were trained on the strict definitions of the 
processes according to the ELM. Further, group unison was defined and discussed at length. The raters’ 
training took place over several sessions with a world expert on decision-making and cognition. Inter-
rater reliability was tested using Fleiss’s kappa, which is appropriate when three raters are used. Our 
analysis provided a kappa of .62, which indicates strong agreement among the raters (Landis et al. 1977). 
The items were not agreed upon were discussed and recoded independently. Only 2 cases the researchers 
could not agree on and were therefore discarded. The results of this coding provided the data necessary to 
complete the second step of the analysis, which was testing the research model in its entirety.  
Results 
Results are presented in two sections. First, we analyzed subject responses to open ended questions and 
coded which cognitive process was used in the decision (e.g., central or peripheral). Second, we evaluated 
the main effects of the manipulations, deception detection mechanisms, and cognitive mechanisms using 
binary logistic regression. Through this two-step analysis, we answered specific questions regarding the 
effects that were drawn from the types of cues in the phishing message while also examining the subjects’ 
cognitive processes suggested by elaboration theory.  To test each hypothesis, we used a binary logistic 
model. This analytic technique was chosen because the dependent variable (DV) and most of the 
independent variables (IVs) were categorical (Pedhazur et al. 1991). Logistic regression is less susceptible 
problems tied to non-normal independent variable data making it an appropriate technique for using our 
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data to evaluate the hypotheses. To ensure the linearity assumptions of logistic regression were met 
(Pedhazur et al. 1991), we used an analysis of the variance inflations factors (VIFs). Our results indicated 
VIFs of less than 0.2, suggesting that it was safe to use binary logistic regression to evaluate hypotheses 
using our dataset.  
The IVs represent the presentation (1 = real.edu, 2 = spoofed.edu, and 3 = mail.com), the content 
conditions (1 = low condition with no content manipulation, 2 = completeness, 3 = clarity, and 4 = 
veridicality), the type of email system utilized by the subjects (deception detection mechanisms coded 1 
through 7 for the different email systems), the type of cognitive process utilized by the subject (1 = 
unknown, 2 = central route  and 3 = peripheral route), and two control variables (sex and age). The 
dependent variable was binary (1 = answered with SSC and 2 = did not give SSC). The enter Wald method 
was used in the regression. This involves testing the model with all of the particular conditions. The final 
model was significant at p < .000 and had a Cox and Snell R-square of .462 and a Nagelkerke R-square of 
.593 (Mertler et al. 2001). Table 2 reports the results of the logistic regression. To determine the impact 
for each IV on our DV (if subjects were deceived), we first identified the statistically significant factors. 
These results show that for content (H1) that clarity was not significant; therefore, it does not influence 
successful deception any more or less than the low condition. In addition, we see that completeness and 
veridicality are both significant. Next, we examined the beta value to see if the influence was positive or 
negative.  
A positive value would indicate that this condition would increase the likelihood of deception success. 
Completeness and veridicality were positive. Finally, we examined the odds ratio labeled Exp (B). The 
odds ratio is the factor that the IV increased (or decreased) the log odds of the DV (Pedhazur et al. 1991). 
The odds ratio is derived from probability of a condition over the baseline condition. For example, the 
odds ratio was 2.622 for the completeness manipulation. This indicates that the likelihood increased 2.6 
times when this manipulation tactic was present over the low condition. The other statistically significant 
trait suggested by the analysis was veridicality. Using the same interpretation as completeness, when 
veridicality was used in the email there was a 3.19 times higher likelihood of the consumer sending his or 
her SSC. Finally, we see that the low condition was significant, and therefore, any content manipulation 
statistically influenced the deception outcome variable. In sum, evidence provided by the data shows that 
content (H1) and types of content: completeness (H1A) and veridicality (H1C) all statistically aided 
successful deception. However, clarity (H1B) did not aid in the likelihood of deception.  
As the frequency statistics suggest, none of the presentation conditions (H2) were statistically significant 
factor in phishing deception. Next, we examined the detection mechanisms. Similar to the presentation 
manipulations, none of the detection mechanisms influenced deception (H3). Conversely, the cognitive 
processing mechanisms influenced the DV. The baseline undetermined processing was significant and 
therefore provides evidence that the cognitive process in general is influential. The peripheral route was 
positive, and therefore, the likelihood of deception increased by 4.6 times when this route was utilized. 
The central route was also statistically significant and, as ELM predicted, decreased the likelihood of 
deception by a factor of 0.74. This result provides evidence for H4. Finally, the control variables of sex and 
age were not significant in this model.  
Discussion 
This study focused on understanding why phishing emails persuade Internet consumers to disclose 
sensitive information. To do so, we examined content and presentation deception techniques along with 
cognitive processes, which are either present in, or applied to, phishing messages sent to Internet 
consumers. To evaluate these factors, we conducted a field experiment that manipulated the presence of 
cues within email messages, while also controlling for the actual email that subjects evaluated, we 
examined the thought process behind their information processing. This differs from other research 
examining the cognitive processes utilized by phishing message recipients which relied on subjects to 
recall past phishing attacks (Vishwanath et al. 2011).  From a phishing perspective, our attack was a 
success. We gained the super secure codes of a quarter of our subjects, as well as other unsolicited 
information, including some subjects’ cell phone numbers, student ID numbers, and even a few Social 
Security numbers. Our analysis suggests that two content-based phishing tactics (completeness and 
veridicality) are more likely to elicit sensitive information from our subjects than context-based tactics. 
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Further, our results were consistent with our ELM-based explanation for phishing effectiveness. 
Specifically, if a subject employed the central route to process our phishing email, deception was less 
likely. However, when a subject employed the peripheral route, subjects were more likely to be deceived.   
When we evaluated the specific tactics, manipulating content through completeness and veridicality more 
effectively deceived our subjects. Completeness is one of the most frequently employed online deception 
tactics, as fabricating an event or circumstances can easily be applied to information intended for a mass 
audience (Wright et al. Forthcoming). Absent of clear deceptive cues (i.e., obvious fabrication or visible 
errors in the message), completeness may be effective because it evokes receivers’ peripheral processing. 
For example, an email lacking errors that offers “nominal risk” such as their zip code or the spouses name 
may not evoke central processing. This may be due to the relatively small risk offered (i.e., it is not large 
enough to evoke concern about fraud). However, there is a continuum to risk. Wright and his colleagues 
(Wright et al. 2010a; Wright et al. 2010b) have previously shown that the dispositional factors, which 
includes risk, impact phishing efficacy. For example, some consumers will give very little information to 
anyone online due to their prospection of this being a high risk behavior, while others will give a great 
deal of detail online because they do not perceive it as high risk.  
Table 2. Results of the Binary Logistic Regression 
Hypotheses Variable Beta S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
C
o
n
ten
t 
Low 
  
9.418 3 0.024 
 
Completeness 0.964 0.560 2.965 1 0.045 2.622 
Clarity -0.282 0.639 0.194 1 0.659 0.754 
Veridicality 1.161 0.560 3.303 1 0.038 3.193 
P
resen
t 
XXX.edu 
  
4.907 2 0.086 
 
spoof.edu 0.808 0.494 2.675 1 0.102 2.243 
mail.com 0.559 0.544 5.531 1 0.133 1.185 
D
etectio
n
 M
ech
an
ism
s 
hotmail.com 
  
5.871 6 0.438 
 
XXX.edu 0.441 0.567 0.604 1 0.437 1.554 
yahoo.com 0.245 0.651 0.142 1 0.707 1.278 
gmail.com -1.339 0.848 2.494 1 0.114 0.262 
aol.com -0.391 0.849 0.212 1 0.645 0.676 
msn.com 0.930 0.909 1.046 1 0.306 2.535 
Other -0.298 0.762 0.153 1 0.696 0.743 
P
ro
cess 
Undetermined 
  
40.894 2 0.000 
 
Peripheral 1.530 0.738 4.295 1 0.038 4.617 
Central -1.738 0.701 6.148 1 0.013 0.176 
 Sex -0.129 0.405 0.101 1 0.751 0.879 
Age 0.122 0.070 3.062 1 0.080 1.129 
  Constant -6.468 2.070 9.767 1 0.002 0.002 
In contrast to completeness, veridicality is a less commonly-employed phishing tactic, as it requires a 
deeper understanding of the target. In this case, we possessed the information necessary to tailor each 
message to each recipient. In an applied setting, such tailoring is possible only after a security breach, 
when phishers have obtained receivers’ confidential information. For organizations, this suggests that 
sensitizing Internet consumers to security breaches when they occur is particularly important. While 
many firms make a practice of contacting account holders after a breach, we believe it is important for 
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such contacts to include information on veridicality tactics that phishers may employ. For example, an 
insurance company that has data stolen may wish to inform customers about the range of ways that the 
stolen data may be used, from customizing emails to appear that they are from the company to competing 
insurance agencies or banking institutions. For individuals, this finding underscores the importance of 
limiting personal information’s online availability that can be used to customize emails.  
While the analysis did not offer support for the effectiveness of clarity, our findings offer insight germane 
to future research on this phishing strategy. To emulate real phishing tactics, we manipulated the sender’s 
email address, not the sender’s name. In our field experiment, subjects replied to “Jason Roth” fairly 
evenly across all three mail domains. According to the ELM, detecting a contextual manipulation such as 
clarity requires central route processing on the part of the receiver, and our results indicate that the 
subjects did not scrutinize the sender’s email address. This finding is consistent with research that when 
receivers directly examine an embedded URL within a message, they can detect the false nature of that 
message (Berghel 2006). In future research, it would be useful for studies to evaluate how features of 
different clarity strategies, such as manipulating the sender’s name as well as the domain name, shape 
Internet consumers’ response to phishing attempts. 
Limitations 
It is important to note our study’s limitations.  For example, one could cite our use of student subjects as a 
deficiency of our study: however, we believe it was appropriate for two reasons. First, students represent 
an important population of Internet consumers who are subject to phishing attempts. Our students 
routinely report receiving phishing emails on professional, personal, and school-related email accounts. 
Second, using a student population strengthened our experiment’s internal validity. We were able to 
ensure our subjects received similar training as well as possessed similar information. Because of our 
control over these factors, we were able to conduct a more rigorous test of phishing tactics’ efficacy. 
We attempted to limit recall bias by explaining the motivation of the study only after we recorded the 
recall of their thought process when the message was received. It is our hope this this may somewhat limit 
recall bias that is introduced using this methodology. Although controlling for recall bias using this 
debriefing method is common in clinical psychology (e.g., controlling for recall bias in food intake; 
Friedenreich et al. 1991) there is limited use or understanding in the extant information systems 
literature. We therefore followed clinical psychology, which found that asking subjects prospectively and 
retrospective created no systematic different and there was little evidence of recall bias.     
Also, we did not actually test whether central or peripheral processing centers in the brain were activated 
by our phishing attack. ELM provides a conceptual understanding of how phishing tactics work. We 
assessed central or peripheral processing through assessing respondents responses to open ended 
questions.  To more rigorously assess cognitive processing, future research may wish to employ two 
additional tests.  First, to evaluate processing, a research design could requires subjects to execute 
memory tests while processing deception emails. By manipulating attention and working memory, 
researchers may glean insights into the black box of cognitive mechanisms (Sip et al. 2008). Second it is 
possible to use fMRI measurement to investigate the centers of the brain engaged by deceptive phishing 
tactics (Abe et al. 2007; Grèzes et al. 2005; Grèzes et al. 2004; Hughes et al. 2005).   
Contributions  
For research, this study offers several important contributions. First, this study extends the e-commerce 
deception theoretical model for describing Internet consumers’ cognitive processes that render consumers 
susceptible to phishing. Our study offers an explanation for why phishing emails lead to deceiving 
Internet consumers. By doing so, our study contributes to the framework for future research that 
examines how and whether central or peripheral processing influences the efficacy of phishing attempts. 
Through adding ELM to the deception framework, we offer a means to understand, and empirically test, 
the role of cognitive mechanisms within the deception detection process. 
Second, our study introduces a unique dependent variable to the deception detection literature. In prior 
work on deceptive communication, research focused on whether individuals could detect cues (Forrest et 
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al. 2000; Reinhard et al. 2008) and whether ones behavioral profile affected intention to answer phishing 
email (Wright et al. 2010a; Wright et al. 2010b). In this study, we move beyond detecting deception to 
evaluating which phishing deception tactics shape actual behavior (i.e., distracting the receiver’s attention 
to the point of being outright deceived). By doing so, we now have evidence within an online deception 
practice that the types of manipulations do impact deception outcomes. This extends the seminal work of 
Johnson et al. (Johnson et al. 1993; Johnson et al. 2001) and Buller, Burgoon et al. (Buller et al. 1996a; 
Buller et al. 1996b; Burgoon et al. 2008; Burgoon et al. 2004; Burgoon et al. 1996) to an online context.    
For practice, this study offers implications for communication processing and information security. First, 
email provides functions for users that are not associated with other communication modalities, including 
task organization, personal archiving, and ubiquitous contact management (Whittaker et al. 2006). 
Internet users spend copious amounts of time and effort managing email functions, in addition to that 
which is necessary for dealing with an overloaded inbox (Bellotti et al. 2005). It should come as no 
surprise, then, if users appraise incoming messages with the less-intensive peripheral route than with 
central route processing. As this study indicates, Internet consumers can be fooled by phishing regardless 
of the detection mechanism. While we cannot say that the deception detection mechanism did not work 
for some subjects, we found no evidence that specific email phishing detection systems are effective.  
Second, managers should offer opportunities for their employees to increase awareness of personal 
information security management (e.g., activate the central processing route). Indeed, research indicates 
that a significant portion of email security breaches are the result of users’ naiveté about possible 
vulnerabilities and the users’ own roles in maintaining security (Stanton et al. 2005). Recent work has 
demonstrated that user training programs and monitoring can be effective for improving user knowledge 
and compliance with security policies (D’Arcy et al. 2009), and similar training efforts are likely to be the 
best weapon in encouraging users to proceed with caution with regard to email. Central route processing 
is contingent upon an individual’s level of motivation, so managers should seek opportunities to make 
users aware of the stakes involved and to motivate users to disseminate information judiciously. 
Conclusion 
This research article set out to deepen understanding of why phishing emails lure unwary Internet 
consumers into sharing sensitive information. Where many studies have focused on the phisher’s website, 
we examined the tactics manifest in the content of email messages. To explain why Internet consumers 
share sensitive information, we turned to the stimulus and deception detection process to understand the 
outcome.  Overall, we found that the e-mail’s content as well as Internet consumers’ cognitive processing 
techniques influenced the effectiveness of Phishing tactics.  
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